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Abstract We consider the exchange of a heterogeneous divisible commodity
modeled as a measurable space. Under rational, continuous and convex preferences
over characteristic measures a weak core is shown to exist. Further, a core exists if
characteristic measures are mutually absolutely continuous. Applied to the land tra-
ding economy, the core existence results in Berliant (J Math Econ 14:53–56, 1985)
and Dunz (Reg Sci Urban Econ 21:73–88, 1991) are obtained.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of exchange of a heterogeneous divisible commodity. One
notable example of such a commodity is land. This problem is coined in the literature as
the “cake division” or “land trading” problem. A heterogeneous divisible commodity
is modeled as a measurable space (X, ). In theoretical models of land economics, X
is assumed to be a Borel measurable subset of Euclidean space R2 (or more generally
Rk), and  to be the Borel σ -algebra B(X) of subsets of X. It is usual to consider this
measurable space with the Lebesgue measure.
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Berliant (1985) is the first to study the core in the context of a land trading economy.
He shows the existence of a competitive equilibrium when preferences over plots are
represented by measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. He derives the core existence result from the existence of a competitive
equilibrium in a land trading economy, which is the main result of his paper (Berliant
1985).
Dunz (1991) studies the existence of the core also in the context of a land
trading economy, but for substantially more general preferences. In Dunz (1991) pre-
ferences are represented by utility functions that are compositions of quasi-concave
functions with a finite number of characteristics of parcels. These characteristics are
countably-additive measures over parcels. Dunz proves that under these assumptions
on preferences and the assumption of absolute continuity of chracteristic measures
with respect to the Lebesgue measure, the weak core of a land trading economy is
nonempty. Assigning a finite number of additive characteristics to parcels is a common
assumption made in empirical literature on land trading. Dunz’s proof of the existence
of the weak core is direct, and uses Scarf’s theorem on the existence of the weak core
in nontransferable utility games and a limiting procedure.
Berliant and Dunz (2004) (BD hereafter) lay the foundations of the general equili-
brium theory for a very general land trading economy adopting preferences over parcels
which take into account their geometric form. BD’s core existence result (Theorem 4)
assumes local nonsatiation, local nonminimization and existence of nonwasteful par-
titions for preferences (For the definitions of the last two properties see BD pages 600
and 605). The main result of the present paper—the weak core existence—does not
make any of these assumptions. However, in proving the coincidence of the weak core
and the core, we assume mutual absolute continuity of the individual characteristic
vector-measures and monotonicity of preferences, which together imply nonwasteful
partitions property. BD [Sect. 5.1] considers a model of exchange similar to that of
the present paper in the context of land exchange. They assume quasi-concave utility
functions of class C1 over characteristic measures. Their core existence result (Theo-
rem 4) applied to this model requires the partial derivatives of utility functions to
be positive and uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity. In economic terms,
this amounts to assuming that the marginal rates of substitution between the charac-
teristics of parcels are uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity (In this regard
see also the definition of separation by hyperplanes assumption in BD, pages 600-
601). In contrast, we admit arbitrary continuous quasi-concave utility functions over
characteristic measures.
A related work is due to Weller (1985) who consider the problem of fair division of
a measurable space (X, ) under the assumption that each agent’s preferences over
measurable subsets are represented by a countably additive measure, and shows the
existence of an envy-free and efficient partition in this problem.
In this paper we prove the existence of the core in a general context of a measurable
space trading economy. Applied to the land trading economy it gives Dunz’s core
existence result.
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2 The model and preliminaries
Let (X, ) be a measurable space (the “cake” or “land plot”) and let P̄ =
{A1, A2, . . . , An} be a measurable ordered partition of X. Let µ1, µ2, . . . , µn be
nonatomic finite vector measures on (X, ) of dimension s1, s2, . . . , sn, respectively.
All measures in this paper are assumed to be countably additive.
The interpretation is that there are n persons (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) each contributing his
share Ai (i ∈ N ) of the whole cake X, and pieces of this cake are valued by individuals
according to their measures µ1, µ2, . . . , µn, respectively. The components of vector-
measure µi (B) are interpreted as measures of different attributes of a measurable piece
B attached to this piece by individual i. We assume that individual i has a preference
i over his subjective attributes’ profiles µi (B), B ∈  and hence over measurable
sets B ∈ . We will use the same symbol i for denoting both of these preferences.
No confusion should arise. Every ordered measurable partition {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} will
be interpreted as a feasible allocation of X . In the sequel, all partitions that we consider
are assumed to be ordered and measurable.
A coalition is an arbitrary nonempty subset of N = {1, . . . , n}. The set of all
coalitions is denoted as N .
Definition 1 A coalition I ⊂ N improves (weakly improves) upon a partition P =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bn} if there exists a partition Q = {Ci | i ∈ I } of A(I ) = ∪i∈I Ai such
that Ci i Bi for all i ∈ I (not Bi i Ci for all i ∈ I and Ci i Bi for at least
one i ∈ I.)
Definition 2 Partition P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} is a weak core partition (core partition)
if no coalition improves (weakly improves) upon partition P. The set of all weak core
partitions is the weak core (core) of the measurable space partition problem.
We will formulate two facts that play central roles in the proofs. We will identify
a vector of vectors (perhaps of different dimensions) as a long vector with scalar
coordinates arranged in the lexicographic order. Sometimes we will denote coordinates
with double indexes, with the first index being the index of a component vector and
the second one the index of a component in that component vector.
The following proposition is a generalization of a result known as Dubins–Spanier’s
theorem (see also Aliprantis and Border 1994, p. 358) and easily follows from that
result. It is to be noted that, in fact, this theorem was discovered a decade earlier
than Dubins and Spanier by Dvoretsky et al. (1951) (see also Chernoff 1951) and is a
consequence of the celebrated Liapunov convexity theorem (Liapunov 1940).
Proposition 1 Let (X, ) be a measurable space and let µ1, µ2, . . . , µn be nonato-
mic finite vector measures on (X, ) of dimensions s1, s2, . . . , sn, respectively. Then,
the following set in Rs, where s = ∑nj=1 s j ,
R = {(µi (Bi ))ni=1 ∈ Rs | P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} is a partition of X}
is compact and convex.
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Proof of Proposition 1 is based on Dubins–Spanier’s theorem. Let µ = (µk)sk=1
be a vector measure (µ1, µ2, . . . , µn) of dimension s. With every partition P =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bn} we associate the s × n matrix of reals M(P) = (µk(Bi )). Denote
by Ms×n the space of all s × n matrices with real entries. By Proposition 1 in Dubins
and Spanier (1961) the range R′ ⊂ Ms×n of matrix-valued function M is compact
and convex.
Let L : Ms×n → Rs be a mapping defined in the following way. The first s1
components of L(M) are the first s1 entries in the first column of matrix M, the
second s2 components are the entries in the second column of M with the row indexes
s1 + 1 through s1 + s2, and so on. Clearly L is a linear mapping with L(R′) = R.
Since R′ is compact and convex it follows that so is R. 
Corollary 2 (“Generalization” of Dubins–Spanier’s Theorem). Let (X, ) be a mea-
surable space and let µ1, µ2, . . . , µn be nonatomic finite vector measures on (X, )
of the same dimension l. Then the following set
M(P)={(µ1(B1), µ2(B2), . . . , µn(Bn)) | P ={B1, B2, . . . , Bn} is a partition of X}
in Ml×n is compact and convex.
In fact, Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 can be considered as versions of Dubins–
Spanier’s Theorem (Dubins and Spanier 1961), that turn out to be convenient in dif-
ferent contexts.
Another important fact is Scarf’s theorem on the existence of the weak core in
nontransferable utility (NTU) games. We first recall the concept of an NTU game.
Let, as before, N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of all players. For each coalition S a set
V (S) in Rn is given. It is assumed that this set is nonempty closed comprehensive and
satisfies the following condition: if x ∈ V (S) and y ∈ Rn are such that xi = yi for all
i ∈ S, then y ∈ V (S). Comprehensiveness means that if x ∈ V (S) and x  y then
y ∈ V (S). Vectors from V (S) are interpreted as utility profiles available to members
of the coalition S. An NTU game is a pair (N , V ) where V is a mapping from N into
subsets of Rn . Denote by int V (S) the interior of V (S). A utility profile x ∈ V (N ) is
a weak core profile if x /∈ int V (S) for all coalitions S. That is, if there is no utility
profile x ′ ∈ V (S) that gives each member of coalition S more utility than x . The weak
core is the set of all weak core profiles.
A collection of coalitions B is balanced if there are weights δS ≥ 0 (S ∈ B) such
that
∑
S∈Bi δS = 1 for every i ∈ N . Here Bi = {S ∈ B | S 
 i}. A game (N , V ) is
balanced if the inclusion
∩S∈BV (S) ⊂ V (N )
holds for an arbitrary balanced collection of coalitions B.
Theorem 3 (Scarf 1967). A balanced NTU game has a nonempty weak core.
Scarf (1967) also shows that nonemptiness of the weak core of a classical exchange
economy with a finite number of homogeneous divisible commodities and convex
preferences is a direct consequence of this theorem.
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However, Theorem 3 does not immediately apply to the model of exchange
considered in this paper. The model of exchange considered here contains an uncoun-
table infinity of commodities, each of which is available exactly in one unit. The com-
modity space is the σ -algebra  of measurable sets of a measurable space (X, ).
In contrast with the classical model, where the commodity space is the nonnegative
orthant of a Euclidean space, the commodity space here has no linear or convex struc-
ture. Accordingly, the proof of the nonemptiness of the weak core for this model
requires more elaborate techniques. For example, closedness of sets V (S) in the case
of classical exchange model is a direct consequence of the continuity of preferences.
Whereas in the present model, the proof of this property makes use of the compactness
statement in Dubins–Spanier’s Theorem.
3 The main result
We will assume that preferences i (i ∈ N ) over characteristic measures are rational,
continuous and convex, so that they can be represented by continuous quasiconcave
utility functions ui (i ∈ N )defined on the space of characteristics Rsi+ (i ∈ N ).We will
represent preferences over  by introducing utility functions Ui (B) = ui (µi (B)) (i ∈
N ). Thus, in addition to the assumptions of the previous section here we assume
rationality (that is, asymmetry and negative transitivity) of preferences.
For a (weak) core partition P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} the utility profile (U1(B1),
U2(B2), . . . , Un(Bn)) will be called a (weak) core utility profile.
Theorem 4 If measures µi (i ∈ N ) are nonatomic and utility functions ui (i ∈ N )
are continuous and quasi-concave, then the weak core of the measurable space trading
economy is nonempty.
Proof The proof will use Proposition 1 and Scarf’s theorem formulated in the previous
section.
For each coalition S define a subset V (S) of Rn in the following way. Consider
all partitions P = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} of ∪i∈S Ai , where C j = ∅ for all j /∈ S. Set
x(P) = (U1(C1), U2(C2), . . . , Un(Cn)) ∈ Rn, A(S) = ∪i∈S Ai and
V0(S) = {x(P) | P is a partition of A(S)}.
We define V (S) as the smallest comprehensive set in Rn containing V0(S) and with
the property: if x ∈ V (S) then x ′ ∈ V (S), if x ′j = x j for all j ∈ S. That is
V (S) = V0(S) + RSc + Rn−,
where Sc = N\S and RSc is the coordinate subspace in Rn whose coordinates have as
subscripts the players in Sc. By Proposition 1 the set {(µi (Ci ))i∈S | {C1, C2, . . . , Cn}
is a partition of A(S) with C j = ∅ for all j /∈ S} is compact. Continuity of
functions ui (i ∈ N ) imply that set V0(S) is compact. Compactness of V0(S) in turn,
implies the closedness of V (S). So, sets V (S) are closed for all S ∈ N .
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Thus, we have defined an NTU game (N , V ). The weak core, WC(N , V ), of this
game is defined as the set of all vectors from V (N )\∪S∈N int V (S). We will show that
nonemptiness of the weak core of this game implies the nonemptiness of the weak
core of the measurable space exchange economy. Let x ∈ WC(N , V ). Then by the
definition of set V (N ), there exists x̄ ∈ V0(N ) with x̄  x . Since x̄ ∈ V0(N ), there
exists a partition P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} of X such that x̄ = (Ui (Bi ))ni=1. We assert
that P belongs to the weak core of the measurable space exchange economy. Indeed,
if a coalition S improves upon partition P, then there exists a partition {Ci/ i ∈ S} of
A(S) such that Ui (Ci ) > Ui (Bi ) = x̄i for i ∈ S. By the definition of V (S), then
int V (S) 
 x̄, and hence, since V (S) is comprehensive int V (S) 
 x . This contradicts
x ∈ WC(N , V ). Thus, if we show that the weak core of the NTU game (N , V ) is
nonempty we are done.
According to Scarf’s theorem if for an arbitrary balanced collection of coalitions
B the inclusion stop
∩S∈B V (S) ⊂ V (N ) (1)
holds, then the weak core of an NTU game is nonempty. Thus, if we show that inclusion
(1) holds, then the theorem will be proved.
Let B be a balanced collection of coalitions with the balancing weights δS ≥
0, S ∈ B. Let x ∈ ∩S∈BV (S). For every coalition S ∈ B the set A(S) = ∪i∈S Ai has
a partition PS = {A1(S), A2(S), . . . , An(S)} such that
U j (A
j (S)) ≥ x j for all j ∈ S and A j (S) = ∅ for all j /∈ S. (2)
Denote
A ji (S) = Ai ∩ A j (S) for i, j ∈ N . (3)
Clearly, for each pair S ∈ B and i ∈ N such that S 
 i, {A1i (S), A2i (S), . . . , Ani (S)}
is a partition of Ai . For i, j ∈ S the set A ji (S) can be interpreted as the part of
endowment of individual i, Ai , which i should give to j so that coalition S achieves
at least the utility profile xS = (xi )i∈S . Pay attention that if {i, j}  S, that is, if i or j
is not a member of S, then A ji (S) = ∅.
So, for each i ∈ N we have a collection of partitions {A1i (S), A2i (S), . . . , Ani (S)} |
S ∈ Bi } of set Ai . Since ∑S∈Bi δS = 1, by Proposition 1 there exists a partition









i (S)) for all j ∈ N . (4)
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Let B j = ∪i∈N A ji , j ∈ N . Then P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} is a partition of X and































The second equality above follows from (4) and the fourth equality from the fact
that {A j1(S), A j2(S), . . . , A jn(S)} is a partition of A j (S).
Since utility functions ui are quasi-concave and
∑
S
 j δS = 1, using inequalities
(2) we obtain from (5)











 j u j (A
j (S)) ≥ x j .
So U j (B j ) ≥ x j for all j ∈ N . Hence x ∈ V (N ). 
4 Examples and existence of the core
As was noted in the Introduction, Theorem 3 implies the main result of Dunz (1991).
Although, this result claims the existence of a core (rather than a weak core) we give an
example demonstrating that under the assumptions made in Dunz (1991) the core may
be empty. Moreover, in Dunz (1991) continuity of utility functions is not explicitly
assumed. We also give an example to illustrate that without the continuity of utility
functions even the weak core may be empty.
Example 1 Let X = [0, 4]×[0, 1], A1 = [0, 2]×[0, 1], A2 = (2, 3]×[0, 1], A3 =
(3, 4]×[0, 1]. Let λ denote the 2-dimensional Lebesgue measure. Let utilities be given
by measures µ1, µ2, µ3 defined as µ1 = λ on [0, 1] × [0, 1], and 0 on (1, 4] ×
[0, 1], and µ2 = µ3 = λ on [1, 4] × [0, 1] and µ2 = µ3 = 0 on [0, 1] × [0, 1].
Then
V (1) = (1,−,−), i.e. V (1) = {x ∈ R3 | x1 ≤ 1},
V (2) = (−, 1,−),
V (3) = (−,−, 1),
V (12) = (1, 2,−), i.e. V (12) = {x ∈ R3 | x1 ≤ 1, x2 ≤ 2},
V (13) = (1,−, 2),
V (23) = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 | x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0, x2 + x3 = 2} + R3−, and V (123) =
F + R3−, where F = {x ∈ R3 | x1 = 1, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0, x2 + x3 = 3}.
The core of this game is empty. The weak core is the set C = {x ∈ R3 | x1 =
1, x2 ≥ 1, x3 ≥ 1, x2 + x3 = 3}. Indeed, for x ∈ C a coalition that contains agent 1
has no way of improving the utility of agent 1, and since for x ∈ V (23), x2 +x3 = 2,
the coalition {2, 3} cannot improve utility profiles in C .
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Example 2 Consider X = [0, 2] × [0, 2] ⊂ R2 with the Lebesgue measure λ. Let
there be two agents with endowments A1 = [0, 1] × [0, 2] and A2 = (1, 2] ×
[0, 2]. Let both agents have the common characteristics µ1, µ2 defined as µi (B) =∫
B hi (x)dλ(x) (i = 1, 2) for measurable set B ⊂ X, where hi (i ∈ N ) is the





x1 for 0 ≤ x1, x2 < 1,
2 − x1 for 1 < x1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ x2 < 1,
−1 elsewhere,
and u2(x1, x2) = u1(x2, x1).
It is easily verified that functions u1, u2 are quasiconcave. It is easy to calculate
V (1) = {(U1, U2) | U1 ≤ 0}, V (2) = {(U1, U2) | U2 ≤ 0} and V (12) ∩ R2+ =
{(U1, U2) : U1 < 1, U2 < 1}. Thus no point in V (12) ∩ R2+ is a weak core utility
profile. Obviously, any point in R2\R2+ is blocked by one of the agents. Therefore the
weak core and hence the core is empty.
For coincidence of the weak core and the core some further assumptions are
required. For vectors x, y ∈ Rk denote x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, . . . , k
and x = y. Preference relation  defined on Rk+ will be called monotone if for
x, x ′ ∈ Rk+, x ′ ≥ x implies x ′  x .
Theorem 5 If preference i is rational, continuous and monotone for each i ∈ N ,
and if the measures νi = ∑sij=1 µ ji (i ∈ N ) are absolutely continuous with respect to
each other, then the weak core and the core coincide. If, in addition, preferences are
convex, then the core of the measurable space trading economy is nonempty.
Proof Let i be the weak preference relation associated with i (i ∈ N ), and let
a coalition I weakly improve upon a partition P = {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} via partition
Q = {Ci | i ∈ I } of A(I ) = ∪i∈I Ai . So we have, not Bi i Ci for all i ∈
I and Ci i Bi for at least one i ∈ I. Since preferences are assumed to be the
strict parts of rational preferences, [not Bi i Ci ] is equivalent to [Ci i Bi ]. Let
Ci0 i0 Bi0 for i0 ∈ I. Then by the monotonicity assumption, µi0(Ci0) ≥ 0. By the
mutual absolute continuity assumption, µi (Ci0) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
By continuity of i0 there exists d > 0 such that for every subset D ⊂ Ci0 with
µi0(D) < d, we have Ci0\D i0 Bi0 . By nonatomicity of measure µi0 , such D exists.
Denote I0 = I \{i0}. By Proposition 1, there exists a partition Di (i ∈ I0) of D
such that µi (Di ) = 1|I0|µi (D) for all i ∈ I0. Define Fi0 = Ci0 \ D, and Fi =
Ci ∪ Di for i ∈ I\{i0}. Then {Fi | i ∈ I } is a partition of A(I ), and by monotonicity
of preferences, Fi i Ci for all i ∈ I. So I improves upon partition P.
Thus we have showed that the weak core and the core coincide. This together with
Theorem 4 implies the other statement of the theorem. 
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